A series of cyberattacks targeting Indian non-banking financial companies has reportedly resulted in losses exceeding ₹300 crore, raising urgent questions about payment-system security, technology governance, fraud monitoring and the emerging use of artificial intelligence in cybercrime.
According to investigations reported by The Economic Times on 29 October 2026 and The Indian Express on 16 November 2026, more than 150 complaints or First Information Reports have been filed in connection with suspected cyberattacks on NBFCs across India.
In Delhi-NCR alone, 12 NBFCs reportedly suffered losses exceeding ₹65 crore over approximately three months. Police have reported arrests and recovery-related interventions, while investigations into the wider incidents continue.
More importantly, the Indian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In) and the Computer Security Incident Response Team for Finance (CSIRT-Fin) have issued critical warnings about attacks exploiting payment and disbursement Application Programming Interfaces (APIs).
These developments highlight a significant risk for financial institutions: attackers may be able to initiate apparently authorised payments by compromising trusted technology infrastructure, even when the underlying loan or transaction has not passed legitimate business approvals.
1. What Happened? The Reported Scale of NBFC Cyberattacks
Recent investigative reporting indicates that multiple NBFCs, particularly smaller lenders, have been targeted through compromised applications, payment interfaces and technology infrastructure.
| Reported development | Details |
| Estimated nationwide losses | More than ₹300 crore |
| Reported complaints / FIRs | More than 150 |
| Delhi-NCR incidents | 12 NBFCs |
| Delhi-NCR reported losses | More than ₹65 crore |
| Police arrests in Delhi-NCR investigation | 20 individuals |
| Funds reportedly intercepted or seized | Approximately ₹18 crore |
| Major regulatory cybersecurity warning | CERT-In Advisory, 9 October 2026 |
| Emerging concern | AI-assisted intrusion and automated exploitation |
The nationwide loss estimate comes from investigative reporting and police-related sources. It has not been independently verified through a consolidated RBI disclosure.
Similarly, the ₹18 crore reported as intercepted or seized should not automatically be interpreted as the amount finally recovered by affected institutions.
Examples of Reported Incidents
Hero FinCorp, August 2026: Delhi Police-related reporting described an incident involving approximately ₹12 crore diverted through hundreds of transactions on 17 August 2026. Investigators examined activity involving numerous network addresses and suspected mule accounts.
Other Delhi-NCR NBFCs, September–October 2026: Several lenders reportedly experienced unauthorised disbursements, with individual incidents involving amounts ranging from lakhs to several crores.
Repeated attacks: Investigative sources have also described cases in which an institution experienced a subsequent attack after an earlier incident, highlighting the danger of incomplete remediation.
The precise technical cause of each individual incident has not been publicly established. However, CERT-In’s sector-wide advisories provide important insight into the attack methods observed across the financial ecosystem.
2. How Attackers Are Exploiting Payment and Disbursement Systems
CERT-In’s critical advisory CIAD-2026-0046, issued on 9 October 2026, describes multiple campaigns targeting NBFCs, digital lenders, fintechs, payment-service providers and wallet operators.
The advisory identifies a particularly dangerous attack pattern involving compromised applications and direct misuse of payment APIs.
The Attack Chain
Stage 1: Initial Compromise
Attackers may exploit vulnerable internet-facing applications, exposed APIs, poorly secured administrative endpoints or compromised credentials.
Stage 2: Access to Trusted Infrastructure
After gaining access, attackers may identify payment-service integrations, authentication credentials and infrastructure already trusted by partner banks or payment gateways.
Stage 3: Bypassing Business Validations
Instead of initiating payments through the legitimate lending workflow, attackers may directly invoke disbursement interfaces.
This can bypass checks that should establish whether a loan exists, has been sanctioned, belongs to the intended borrower and is eligible for payment.
Stage 4: Unauthorised Fund Transfers
Fraudulent instructions may contain invalid reference identifiers, exceed normal transaction limits or direct funds to attacker-controlled beneficiary accounts.
Stage 5: Movement Through Mule Accounts
The proceeds may be distributed across multiple bank accounts, reducing the time available for intervention and recovery.
Why This Is Particularly Dangerous
Traditional cybersecurity monitoring may recognise an API request as originating from an approved server.
However, the source of the request does not establish whether the underlying financial transaction is legitimate.
An authorised server can transmit an unauthorised payment instruction if the server, its credentials or its application environment has been compromised.
This distinction is central to understanding the risk.
3. The Role of AI-Assisted Cyberattacks
Recent investigations have raised concerns about the use of AI-enabled offensive security tools to accelerate cyberattacks.
On 15 October 2026, CERT-In issued an advisory concerning AI agents and malicious activity involving autonomous systems.
A subsequent CSIRT-Fin warning, CIAD-2026-0058, identified an ongoing AI-assisted financial threat campaign designated CRAFTY FALCON.
The advisory identified tools and frameworks including ARTEX, PentAGI, Cairn and CyberStrikeAI.
According to the warning, these tools may help attackers automate reconnaissance, develop and refine attack scripts, adapt to system responses and execute multiple activities rapidly.
What Does AI Change?
Artificial intelligence does not necessarily create a completely new category of vulnerability.
Instead, it can make existing attack techniques faster, more scalable and easier to repeat.
Three developments are particularly important.
1. Faster reconnaissance and exploitation
Automated systems can analyse exposed infrastructure and identify potential weaknesses more rapidly than purely manual processes.
2. Reduced time between compromise and financial loss
Attackers may move from initial access to attempted financial exploitation within a shorter period, reducing the opportunity for conventional security reviews.
3. Rapid adaptation and repeated attacks
AI-assisted tooling may help attackers modify their approach when a particular technique is blocked.
This increases the importance of complete remediation, continuous monitoring and repeated validation of security controls.
It is important to distinguish these confirmed sector-wide threat observations from individual incident attribution. The use of AI-assisted tools in a wider campaign does not establish that every reported NBFC loss was caused by artificial intelligence.
4. The Underlying Risk: Trusted Technology Without Independent Transaction Validation
The most important lesson from these incidents concerns the relationship between technology security and financial transaction controls.
Financial institutions often depend on approved applications, trusted network locations and authenticated service accounts to process transactions efficiently.
However, a system may be technically authorised to communicate with a bank while a particular payment instruction remains commercially unauthorised.
Consider a digital lending platform.
A legitimate disbursement should ordinarily be linked to an approved loan, an eligible customer, a verified beneficiary, an authorised amount and a valid transaction reference.
If a payment API accepts an instruction merely because it originates from a trusted application, the institution may be exposed to serious risk.
Effective payment security therefore requires two distinct levels of assurance:
Technical authentication: Is the request coming from an authorised system or identity?
Business authorisation: Does the requested transaction correspond to a legitimate, approved and independently validated financial obligation?
Both are necessary.
Network whitelisting, API keys and application authentication should not be treated as substitutes for transaction-level validation.
5. Key Control Weaknesses Financial Institutions Should Examine
The reported attack methods identify several control areas requiring immediate attention.
A. API Credential Management
Long-lived credentials, embedded secrets and inadequately protected service accounts can create significant exposure.
Institutions should review credential storage, rotation, access restrictions and monitoring.
B. Application and API Security
Unused, deprecated or inadequately secured APIs may create unintended routes into sensitive systems.
Security assessments should include all payment-related interfaces, not only customer-facing applications.
C. Independent Payment Authorisation
Disbursement systems should verify loan approval, customer identity, beneficiary details, transaction amount and applicable limits independently of the requesting application.
D. Transaction Monitoring
High-frequency transfers, abnormal payment volumes, unusual beneficiary patterns and invalid transaction references should trigger investigation.
E. Reconciliation
Delayed reconciliation can allow unauthorised transactions to accumulate before discrepancies are identified.
High-risk payment environments require timely reconciliation between the lending system, payment instructions, banking records and general ledger.
F. Incident Response
Institutions must be able to disable compromised credentials, suspend affected interfaces, preserve evidence and coordinate quickly with banking partners.
These are sector-wide control priorities. They should not be interpreted as confirmed deficiencies at every institution named in media reports.
6. Early Warning Signals for Cyber-Fraud Detection
| Early warning signal | Potential risk |
| Sudden increase in disbursement requests | Automated or unauthorised payment activity |
| Multiple payments without valid loan references | Bypass of loan approval workflow |
| Transactions exceeding approved limits | Inadequate transaction-level validation |
| New beneficiaries receiving repeated transfers | Possible mule-account concentration |
| Payment requests outside normal operating patterns | Potential compromised application activity |
| Unusual use of privileged service accounts | Credential misuse or unauthorised access |
| Payment activity inconsistent with loan records | Reconciliation or transaction-integrity concern |
| Repeated suspicious activity after remediation | Incomplete containment or persistent compromise |
These indicators should be investigated using supporting evidence. An anomaly alone does not prove fraud.
7. What Should IT Auditors and Internal Auditors Test?
Internal Audit and Information Systems Audit functions should assess whether controls are not only documented but also operating effectively.
Practical Audit Testing Matrix
| Audit area | Recommended test | Evidence required |
| API authentication | Verify credential lifecycle, access restrictions and rotation | API gateway configuration, access logs, credential inventory |
| Payment authorisation | Confirm that each payment requires valid loan approval and beneficiary verification | Loan records, sanction logs, payment instructions |
| Transaction limits | Test enforcement of per-transaction and cumulative limits | Limit configurations, exception logs |
| Service-account access | Review privileged permissions and unusual account activity | Identity and access records, authentication logs |
| Application security | Review vulnerability testing and remediation of exposed interfaces | Security assessments, patch records, penetration-test reports |
| Payment reconciliation | Reconcile payment instructions against sanctioned loans and bank debits | Bank statements, disbursement logs, general ledger |
| Fraud monitoring | Test alert generation and escalation for abnormal transactions | Monitoring rules, alert records, case-management logs |
| Incident response | Assess containment, evidence preservation and recovery procedures | Incident reports, response plans, exercise results |
| Third-party oversight | Review payment gateway and technology-provider controls | Contracts, due diligence, assurance reports |
Where credible indicators suggest systemic compromise, auditors should consider full-population transaction analysis rather than relying only on conventional samples.
8. RBI’s 2026 Cybersecurity Directions: What NBFCs Must Understand
On 31 July 2026, RBI issued the Non-Banking Financial Companies – Cybersecurity, Technology: Risk, Resilience and Assurance Framework Directions, 2026, effective immediately.
The framework establishes requirements proportionate to the regulatory classification and asset size of NBFCs.
Key Regulatory Expectations
Board oversight: Boards must approve technology and cybersecurity strategies and policies and review them at least annually.
Baseline cybersecurity controls: Smaller Base Layer NBFCs and Core Investment Companies are subject to defined baseline requirements, including access controls, user roles, maker-checker arrangements, cybersecurity safeguards and continuity planning.
IT governance and risk assessment: Larger Base Layer NBFCs have additional requirements relating to technology governance, IT operations, information security and risk assessments.
Enhanced controls for Middle, Upper and Top Layer NBFCs: The framework includes more extensive expectations concerning IT governance, cybersecurity risk management, monitoring, assurance and resilience.
Information Systems Audit: Applicable institutions must establish appropriate audit arrangements, with oversight by the Audit Committee.
The directions reinforce the principle that cybersecurity governance must reflect an institution’s actual technology exposure, not merely its organisational size.
The specific obligations depend on the NBFC’s applicable regulatory layer and other provisions of the directions.
9. The Three Lines Model: Who Should Own the Controls?
Cybersecurity incidents involving financial transactions cannot be managed effectively by the IT department alone.
First Line: Lending Operations, Digital Business and Technology Operations
Responsible for maintaining secure payment processes, verifying transactions, enforcing operational controls and resolving process exceptions.
Second Line: Information Security, Operational Risk, Fraud Risk and Compliance
Responsible for independent risk oversight, control challenge, fraud monitoring, regulatory compliance and escalation of material exposures.
Third Line: Internal Audit
Responsible for independently evaluating the design and operating effectiveness of security, payment and governance controls.
Board and Senior Management
Responsible for ensuring adequate resources, risk oversight, accountability and remediation of significant weaknesses.
The critical requirement is coordination between these functions, particularly where a cybersecurity compromise creates immediate financial exposure.
10. Illustrative Scenario: How a Compromised Payment Interface Could Generate Major Losses
Consider a hypothetical NBFC processing digital loan disbursements.
Its payment interface normally processes 200 approved disbursements per day.
Following a compromise, the institution receives 600 additional payment requests within two hours.
These requests originate from an application server that is normally trusted by its payment partner.
However, the requests do not match valid sanctioned loan records.
If the system relies primarily on server authentication and does not independently validate each payment against the lending database, the requests could be processed despite lacking legitimate business approval.
A properly designed control environment would seek to detect the abnormal volume, reject instructions without valid approval records, apply cumulative payment limits and alert responsible personnel.
This is a hypothetical teaching example, not a reconstruction of any reported NBFC attack.
It demonstrates why secure infrastructure, transaction integrity and fraud monitoring must operate together.
11. What Should NBFCs Do Immediately?
The current threat environment justifies a focused review of payment security and incident preparedness.
| Priority | Recommended action | Primary ownership |
| Immediate | Review exposed payment APIs and privileged credentials | CISO, IT Security |
| Immediate | Verify independent transaction and beneficiary validation | Digital Lending, Operations |
| Immediate | Strengthen real-time monitoring of disbursement activity | Fraud Risk, IT Operations |
| High | Review payment gateway and partner-bank integrations | Technology, Vendor Risk |
| High | Test reconciliation and exception escalation | Finance, Operations |
| High | Assess exposure to AI-assisted attack campaigns | Security Operations Centre |
| High | Validate incident containment and recovery arrangements | CISO, Operational Risk |
| Ongoing | Conduct independent control assurance and remediation tracking | Internal Audit, Risk Committee |
Institutions should also review relevant indicators of compromise and technical detection guidance issued through CERT-In and CSIRT-Fin.
12. What Should CROs and Boards Ask?
Senior management should seek clear answers to the following questions:
- Can any payment API initiate a disbursement without independent verification of the underlying approved loan?
- Are privileged credentials, API tokens and payment-service accounts adequately protected and monitored?
- Can the institution identify unusual payment activity in near real time?
- How quickly can suspicious payment interfaces be suspended and partner banks notified?
- Have previously identified vulnerabilities been independently retested after remediation?
- Does Internal Audit have sufficient technical expertise to evaluate API security and digital payment controls?
- Are cybersecurity incidents, financial fraud losses and technology control weaknesses reported together to the relevant Board committees?
These questions are intended to produce evidence of effective controls rather than general assurances that cybersecurity policies exist.
13. Strengthening Professional Capability Through RMAI Training
The incidents demonstrate why financial institutions need professionals who understand cybersecurity, payment-system risks, technology governance and operational resilience.
The Risk Management Association of India (RMAI), through its training arm Smart Online Course, offers a specialised programme:
Cyber Security & Technology Risk Management in Banking
The programme covers:
- Technology Risk Landscape and Governance Responsibility.
- Vendor, Cloud and API Risk Oversight.
- Access Control and Data Privacy Governance.
- Incident Response and Escalation Governance.
- Board Reporting and Cyber Risk Transparency.
Programme Highlights: 7 hours of self-paced learning, practical case-study-based coverage and 120-day course access.
Programme Fee: ₹3,500 per participant.
The programme offers dual certification through RMAI and the BFSI Sector Skill Council of India, subject to the applicable completion and assessment requirements.
Submit your nomination here: LINK
The programme is relevant for banking and NBFC professionals working in Information Security, IT Risk, Operational Risk, Compliance, Internal Audit and Digital Banking Operations.
14. Conclusion: Cybersecurity Must Protect the Transaction, Not Just the System
The reported ₹300 crore-plus cyber-fraud losses affecting Indian NBFCs demonstrate the financial consequences that can arise when attackers compromise payment infrastructure and exploit weaknesses in transaction validation.
CERT-In’s advisories indicate that AI-assisted techniques may accelerate the identification and exploitation of vulnerabilities, making traditional response timelines increasingly inadequate.
However, the fundamental risk management lesson is not simply that cybercriminals are using artificial intelligence.
It is that financial institutions must ensure that every payment instruction is independently authorised, continuously monitored and reconciled, regardless of whether it originates from a trusted application or network.
For NBFCs, digital lenders and financial institutions, effective cybersecurity now requires coordinated technology controls, fraud detection, operational risk governance and independent assurance.
Institutions that strengthen these capabilities will be better positioned to prevent unauthorised disbursements, detect suspicious activity and respond effectively when attacks occur.
Sources and References
- The Indian Express, 16 November 2026: 12 NBFCs Lose Over ₹65 Crore in Delhi-NCR
- The Economic Times, 29 October 2026: AI-Powered Cyberattacks Siphon ₹300 Crore from Small NBFCs
- CERT-In Advisory CIAD-2026-0046, 9 October 2026: Payment and Disbursement API Attacks
- CERT-In / CSIRT-Fin Advisory CIAD-2026-0058: Ongoing AI-Assisted Financial Threat Campaign
- RBI: NBFC Cybersecurity, Technology, Risk, Resilience and Assurance Framework Directions, 2026
- RBI: Information Technology Governance, Risk, Controls and Assurance Practices Directions, 2023
Editorial note: This analysis is based on publicly available information reviewed as of 17 November 2026. Reported financial losses and complaint totals remain preliminary. Sector-wide attack techniques and control recommendations should not be interpreted as confirmed findings against any individual institution.